Strategy Report 2017 for Sweden's regional development cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa 2016-2021

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*Update of the strategy implementation and assessment of results since the latest strategy reporting date until April 15, 2018*

# Summary of Sida's Assessment of the Development towards the Strategy Objectives and Implementation of the Contribution Portfolio

| | Objective[1] | Portfolio[2] |
|---|---|---|
| **1. A better environment, sustainable use of natural resources, reduced climate impact and strengthened resilience to environmental…** | | |
| 1.1 A better environment, sustainable use of natural resources, reduced climate impact and strengthened resilience to environmental impact,… | | |
| 1.2 Strengthened capacity of regional actors to work towards sustainable management and use of common ecosystem services… | | |
| 1.3 Increased production of, and access to, renewable energy | | |
| **2.Strengthened democracy and gender equality and greater respect for human rights** | | |
| 2.1 Enhanced capacity of regional actors to work towards strengthened democracy and the rule of law, gender… | | |
| 2.2 Enhanced capacity of civil society and media to work towards accountability and respect for human rights at regional level | | |
| **3. Better opportunities and tools to enable poor and vulnerable people to improve their living conditions** | | |
| 3.1 Strengthened opportunities for increased economic integration and trade | | |
| 3.2 Improved conditions, especially for women and young people, for productive employment with decent working conditions | | |
| 3.3 Strengthened capacity of regional actors to work towards sustainable solutions concerning refugee situations and migration flows… | | |
| **4.Human security and freedom from violence** | | |
| 4.1 Strengthened capacity of regional actors for peace and reconciliation | | |
| 4.2 Strengthened capacity of regional actors to combat violent extremism | | |
| 4.3 Increased influence and participation by women and young people in processes for peace and reconciliation. | | |

[1] Assessment of the **development towards the strategy objectives**: Green: Desirable direction; Yellow: Partially desirable direction; Red: Undesirable direction.
[2] Assessment of the **implementation of the contribution portfolio**: Green: According to plan; Yellow: Partially according to plan; Red: Not as planned.

# Svensk sammanfattning av Strategy Report 2017 for Sweden's regional development cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa 2016-2021

Inga händelser under 2017 föranleder en förändring av ambassadens genomförandestrategi (den s.k. operationaliseringsplanen, beslutad i juni 2016) trots fortsatta trender av väpnade konflikter, krympande utrymme för civilsamhället, omfattande migrations- och flyktingströmmar och stora utmaningar med sysselsättning för kontinentens växande och unga befolkning. Förbättrad givarsamordning, minskad insatsfragmentering och en förutsägbar finansiering till Afrikanska unionen och de subregionala organisationerna, inklusive ökad egenfinansiering, eftersträvas fortsatt.

Inom stödområde 1 har strategigenomförandet fortlöpt planenligt med målsättningen ökad konsolidering av insatsportföljen genom finansiering av färre antal insatser till förmån för större program.

Inom stödområde 2 har genomförandet huvudsakligen fortlöpt planenligt trots kontinentens många utmaningar vad gäller demokrati, MR och jämställdhet, men förseningar har uppstått i förhållande till mål 2.2.

Inom stödområde 3 har genomförandet huvudsakligen fortlöpt planenligt, med en fortsatt konsolidering av insatsportföljen inom ekonomisk integration och handel (mål 3.1). De två nya strategiområdena produktiv sysselsättning med anständiga arbetsvillkor (3.2) samt flyktingsituationer och migrationsströmmar (3.3) har fokuserat på analys och dialog för framtida stöd jämte en kartläggning inom det förra området, samt insatsberedningar inom det senare.

Inom stödområde 4 har genomförandet huvudsakligen skett planenligt trots stora kontinentala utmaningar, både genom en inledd omorientering samt konsolidering av insatsportföljen. Stöd till nyckelinsatser har inletts i frågor avseende stärkt medlingskapacitet och kontinentala varningssystem, motverkande av våldsam extremism samt utfasning av tidigare stöd.

# 1 Overview of the Strategy Context

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Total amount for the Strategy**: 445MSEK | **Disbursed Amount 2017**: 424 MSEK | **Number of Contributions 2017**: 107 |

## 1.1 Changes in the Context

The operationalization of the strategy was finalized in May 2017 by an Embassy decision to approve the operationalization plan. Over the course of 2017, the general trends continued and no major changes came to light that could form a basis for changing the section's overall implementation strategy. It can be noted that previously reported trends of increasing armed conflict across the continent and a shrinking space for civil society organisations continues. Trends regarding migration and refugee flows, both intra- and extracontinental, continue at historically high levels and despite a modestly increasingly GDP the continent struggles to create employment for its increasing and increasingly young population.

## 1.2 Sweden's Role in the Strategy Context

Swedish regional development cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa celebrates its 10th anniversary, and having focused the implementation of the regional programme to Addis Ababa makes Sweden a relatively larger player at the continental level than in the typical bilateral context in Africa. In the donor context Sweden has been striving for improved donor coordination and emphasizes the importance of long-term, predictable funding for AU/RECs to decrease fragmentation of activities and allow for stronger ownership and institutional capacity building. The trend of donors moving towards more earmarking of funding towards specific activities and politically prioritized areas has continued, partly because of the weak results and limitations in core capacities of the partners to ensure sound fiduciary responsibility in the management of pool funds (Joint Financing Arrangements; JFAs) for both the African Union (AU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).

At the regional, sub-regional or multi-country levels, there is no institutionalized donor coordination between the EU member states. However, donors coordinate around regional actors, such as IGAD, that convenes a partner's forum for donors.  IGAD is in the process of receiving a four-year financing under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for the Horn of Africa. An initiative that has been supported by Sweden and that will be managed by Austria through the delegated partnership agreement. Sweden has committed Euro 1 million to co-finance the intervention through a delegation/bilateral agreement with Austria to manage the fund. The set-up is intended to reduce transaction costs and harmonize activities as well as provide a platform for policy dialogue with IGAD which has previously been difficult to achieve when focus has been on technical level dialogues on specific programme funding. The EUTF-IGAD mechanism is open for additional support and the Netherlands has shown interest and taken steps to initiate financial support.

## 1.3 Synergies with Other Swedish Strategies

Developing synergies between the regional programme and bilateral programmes across the continent, as well as the regional SRHR programme, is identified as priority objective in the operationalization plan. In the course of 2017, two areas were identified as starting points for exploring potential synergies: the support to the implementations of National Determined Contributions (NDC) of the Paris Agreement and the ratification and domestication of the Maputo Protocol on Women's Rights and Gender Equality. Theses specific processes were chosen as they are processes that span across the continent, are of relevance to a majority of bilateral programs, and have a connection to planned regional contributions. A mapping of the potential for developing synergies in the area of NDC implementation was done with support from the help desk for environment. This mapping identified several potential areas for synergies but also underlined the need to allocate staff resources to support the process of developing synergies. This work will be continued during 2018 with a mapping study of synergies related to the Maputo Protocol and follow up on the recommendations of the NDC mapping.

In addition to these to mapping exercises aiming at proactively and strategically developing synergies at the policy level, there are of course numerous other synergies between the regional portfolio and bilateral and global strategies, mostly at the technical level, relating to inter alia coordinated or complementary support to the same partner organisations, or within the same thematic field, such as e.g. renewable energy.

## 1.4 Allocation between Areas of Support

During 2017, a total of 424.4 MSEK were disbursed, out of a total allocation of 425 MSEK. The disbursements were distributed between the support areas according to Table 1 in P6 Annex to Strategy Report 2017. Generally, allocations per Areas of Support were done according to the operationalization plan although some reallocations were done between areas. It is expected that this will be balanced during the remaining strategic period and that the allocation of funding between areas envisaged in the operationalization plan will be realized. However, the Embassy is constrained in terms of human resources as it has not been possible to recruit new staff as planned and, despite extensive but to some extent irregular and fragmented support from Stockholm, this has affected the number of new contributions that are currently being planned, in comparison with the operationalization plan and is the reason why some “traffic lights” with regard to Portfolio are yellow, rather than green. It has also affected the disbursement plan where the section is currently (April 2018) at 91% of the total strategy amount (based on forecasted disbursement of priority 1 contributions). A plan to address this gap is currently under development.

# 2 Results Reporting

## 2.1 Area of Support 1: A better environment, sustainable use of natural resources, reduced climate impact and strengthened resilience to environmental impact, climate change and natural disasters

### 2.1.1 Objective 1.1: Strengthened capacity of regional actors to work towards sustainable management and use of common ecosystem services and natural resources

*Development towards the strategy objective*

As a continent endowed with abundant natural resources, the sustainable management of these resources together with their use to motor inclusive growths are clear priorities that are underlined in continental and sub-regional strategies and development plans. Improved resource governance is widely recognized as a necessity to realize the ambitions goals of Agenda 2063 especially given global recession of commodity prices, the continents population growth and the expected impacts of climate change. The operationalization plan identifies three specific areas that are the focus for the regional program to achieve objective 1.1: transboundary water management, forestry management and marine resources and fisheries management. These areas have all seen a favourable development during 2017 - in relative terms - the capacity of regional institutions and organizations is generally low and overstretched, underscoring the need for future support but the progress reaffirms the prioritizing in the operationalization plan.

The progress seen in these areas during 2017 has in several instances been related to high level global and continental processes. The global climate change negotiations (especially the Paris Agreement) and the Sustainable Development Goals have shaped dialogues and agendas in the area of sustainable resources management. Transboundary water management has benefitted from an increased focus by the Africa Union (AU) both to address the infrastructure gap across the continent under the continental AU-NEPAD/PIDA program, as a target sector in the African Resilience Investment Initiative[3], and as a major resource for meeting the continent's growing energy demand as highlighted in Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI). Forest resources management is an important part of many Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) of the Paris Agreement, which has promoted action and as an example during 2017, the Sustainable Forest Management Framework for Africa, SFMA[4] has been submitted to AMCEN for endorsement. SFMA is a framework providing a very logical basis to guide forestry development on the continent, including its monitoring and reporting, as well as gauging the continent's compliance to recommendations/resolutions that emanate from discourses on the three Rio Conventions (UNFCCC, UNCCD, and UNCBD), in addition to UNFF and the SDGs.

*Portfolio level*

The operationalization plan highlighted the need to reduce the number of contributions in this results area and channel Sida's support through larger program - one substantial contribution and potentially one smaller strategic contribution per natural resource type. This plan was implemented during 2017 and assessments were initiated to grow the portfolio in the area of marine resources and fisheries[5] and in the area of forest management[6]. However, the largest change was in the area of transboundary water management, where two decade-long supports were concluded in 2017: In the Pungwe basin (Mozambique, Zimbabwe) and the Okavango basin (Botswana, Namibia and Angola)[7]. In both cases the Swedish Support has aimed at building the capacity for regional cooperation over shared water resources. In the Pungwe basin the collaboration led to the signing of a bilateral Agreement for the joint management of the Pungwe River, and has strengthened capacity for Transboudnary Water Management (TWM) at the national level of the two concerned countries. In the Okavango long term Swedish support has positioned the Okavango River Basin Commission at a point where it will take a leap towards real joint management and benefit sharing in the basin.

*Contribution level*

The World Bank Trust fund "Cooperation on International Waters in Africa (CIWA[8])" is becoming the main vehicle for Sweden's continued support to transboundary water management on the continent. CIWA's combined focus on institutions, information and investment is proving successful in several basins across Africa and during 2017 projects were funded in the Niger basin, the Nile basin, the Okawongo basin and in the Zambezi basin – all basins where Sida has had long term project support but with direct support to the basin commissions. This illustrates how the regional portfolio has been consolidated in terms of numbers of contributions but with maintained support to several geographic regions and partners. As of 2017, CIWA has contributed to the mobilization of USD 5 billion for investment across the continent, with a potential of 20 million beneficiaries of the projects.

### 2.1.2 Objective 1.2: Strengthened capacity of regional actors to work towards increased resilience against climate change and natural disasters, including capacity for food security

*Development towards the strategy objective*

[3] Planned contribution 11011 WB, Africa Climate Resilient Investment Facility
[4] Framework developed by AFF – 51000123 African Forest Forum
[5] 10980, FAO, Marine environment and fishing, 2018-2021
[6] 10991,FAO, West Africa Forest Initiative
[7] Pungwe River Integrated Water Res. Man. II PlusID 73000674; 51000115 OKACOM Phase 2
[8] 51000121, WB MDTF CIWA

The continent's exposure and vulnerability to natural disasters and the impacts of climate change was made apparent during the course of 2017 by droughts, floods and landslides leading to fatalities, displacement and food insecurity. These challenges are recognized and are receiving due attention at continental and regional levels. UNFCCC work streams, together with the Paris Agreement, are providing much of the momentum but the African Union, RECs and individual countries have gone far to link up to global actors and mechanisms and to domesticate commitments. The African Group of Negotiators[9] plays an important role in facilitating the dialogue around climate change across the continent as well as representing African countries during the United Nations climate negotiations.

The creation in 2017 of an African Centre for Nationally Determined Contributions housed by the African Development Bank[10] is an important step in turning the discussions into concrete and coordinated actions. This will be important to improve African states implementation of the Paris Agreement but it is also an opportunity to facilitate access to global climate finance, like the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Fund. Also, the creation of Climate Commissions for both the Congo Basin and for the Sahel region is seen as recognition by AU member states of the need for regional cooperation to address the impacts of a changing climate. Despite the positive development in 2017 and recent years, capacity remains low to identify, prioritize and to implement projects building resilience and adapting to climate change. As identified in the operationalization plan, the focus in the near term should be on promoting climate services and supporting project preparation facilities.

*Portfolio level*

The portfolio is developing in accordance to the operationalization plan, with no deviations to report for 2017. The current composition is deemed balanced with support to continental institutions like the African Development Bank, to civil society through the pan-African network PACJA, and to the regional economic community ECOWAS[11]. Support to another continental institution, Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has been initiated according to the operationalization plan. Integrating a climate perspective is an important part of the development of new contributions for each of the three objectives in support area 1.

*Contribution level*

The African Forest Forum, with the main focus on resource management, provided support for the African Group of Negotiators to prepare Africa's position before the climate negotiations in Bonn, COP23. The consensus document reflecting the Africa Group's common position on forest resource management, whose development was facilitated by AFF's Technical Support Team, was also instrumental in the effective articulation of Africa's position in UNFF12 intergovernmental dialogue on the implementation of the adopted United Nations Strategic Plan on Forests (UNSPF) 2017-2030 and Quadrennial Programme of Work (QPOW) 2017-2020.

This is in line with the ambition to effectively mainstream climate change within all contributions in the support area 1. Sida has patiently been supporting the ClimDev Special Fund[12] administered by AfDB since 2013 and activities are finally picking up. As of December 2017, the fund has approved 28 investments to increase access to climate services for a total of € 30 million - with a demand for funds that is forecasted to increase. The Climate Change Centre in the ECOWAS Commission[13] has rolled out training with the Green Climate Fund to facilitate access to funding and to improve the capacity to prepare and appraise climate projects for its member states and regional accredited entities. Linking regional and national actors with mechanisms for global climate finance is strategically important as

[9] Supported by AFF 51000123/ 51050113 PACJA
[10] 51030015 AfDB, ClimDev Special Fund CDSF
[11] 51050040 ECOWAS, Climate Change Adaptation
[12] 51030015 AfDB, ClimDev Special Fund CDSF
[13] 51050040 ECOWAS, Climate Change Adaptation

funding requirements in terms of adaptation and mitigation will not be meet by funds available at the national level or thought bilateral development cooperation support.

### 2.1.1 Objective 1.3: Increased production of, and access to, renewable energy

*Development towards the strategy objective*

The number of people without access to electricity in Africa is still (2016) around 590 million, but is since 2013 decreasing due to efforts of governments, donors and private sector investments. Further, around 10 million small and medium enterprises have no access to electricity. In sub-Saharan Africa 43% now have access to electricity, with around 26 million new connections annually. Although coal is still a main source of energy, hydropower, geothermal, solar and wind are increasing substantially with almost all new investments going into these areas. Even small inputs in access to electricity could make large contributions economic outputs.[14]

Further, interconnecting the small power systems of different countries, increases energy security and lower the costs of electricity through avoided investments in new generation. It is estimated that full expansion of regional power trade in the SAPP could save the region US$1.1 billion annually in power costs. When Ethiopia is connected to Kenya and Tanzania through an interconnector under construction, it is estimated to increase the access to foreign exchange in Ethiopia with 25%. [15]

*Portfolio level*

Sida is supporting regional integration in the field of (renewable) energy through two programs; i) AREP (Advancing Regional Energy Projects) - a multi-donor trust fund managed by the World Bank and ii) support together with Norway for the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). The trust fund contains components for strategic studies for the expansion of the energy market, regional power trade development and investment preparation in regional transmission lines and electrical generation projects, in renewable energy. The support to the East African Power Pool (EAPP) is at an infancy stage and has not yet developed into any substantial regional power trade. The trust fund (AREP) has been slow in starting up, particularly in East Africa.

In addition 2 projects[16] have been decided upon and 4 projects[17] are in an advanced preparatory phase for increasing access to energy through multi-country approaches.

*Contribution level*

The support to SAPP has been going on for several years and is steadily increasing the volume of regional traded electricity, contributing to the objective of regional economic integration. In the SAPP region feasibility studies for 2 generation projects (hydro) and 6 transmission lines are at an advanced stage, due to the financing of the MDTF/AREP.

A number of transmission lines are in the pipe-line in the EAPP region, such as the interconnector between the SAPP and EAPP systems (Zam-Tan), and the Eth-Ken-Tan interconnector to name the two

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[14] Energy Access Outlook 2017, Chapter 4 on energizing development in Sub-Saharan Africa, International Energy Agency

[15] World Bank appraisal document for Advancing Regional Energy Projects in sub-Saharan Africa.

[16] AECF Renewable Energy and Adaptation to Climate Technologies (REACT) window and a guarantee to the Crowdfunding platform Trine (https://www.jointrine.com/ )

[17] Universal Green Energy Access Programme (UGEAP), Energy Efficient Lighting and Appliances project in Southern and Eastern Africa (EELAA), Private Financing Advisory Network, PFAN, and a guarantee to the crowdfunding platform "Lendahand".

most prominent. In the NELSAP region another 5 inter-country transmission lines are under construction.

The characters of the support programs recently decided upon or at an advanced planning stage are to promote innovations (REACT), scale up project ideas through brokering contacts between project developers and financiers (PFAN), crowding in private capital (Trine, Lendahand, UGEAP) and to introduce minimum energy performance standards for key electricity products in the Eastern and Southern Africa regions (EELAA). As only two of the contributions have been decided upon, and are in a start-up phase, few concrete results could be reported on.

## *2.2* **Area of Support 2:** Strengthened democracy and gender equality and greater respect for human rights

### 2.3 **Objective 2.1:** Enhanced capacity of regional actors to work towards strengthened democracy and the rule of law, gender equality and increased respect for human rights, with a focus on the rights of women and children

*Development towards the strategy objective*

Within the area of democracy, human rights and gender equality the overall tendency in Africa ever since the mid-2000s has been one of stagnation and even backsliding. Currently, less than 40 per cent of Africa's population live in 21 countries categorized as democracies.[18] Continental and international human rights norms ratified by African countries are seldom fully respected and even if general elections may be performed in a technically correct manner, the circumstances conditioning the electoral process as such often make citizens choiceless and permit authoritarian or repressive regimes to continue to hold on to power for decades. Developments over the continent are far from uniform, however, and there are also encouraging examples of institutional stability and of democratic achievements. During 2017, two positive examples in this context were the peaceful transition within the ruling party in South Africa and the non-violent regime change in the Gambia.

Against this backdrop, the strength of regional and sub-regional actors assumes great importance. Concerning the African Union and its Commission, an ambitious reform package addressing improved efficiency, mandatory observance of ratified treaties and increased self-financing of the Union has recently been elaborated and approved by the Heads of States. The implementation process now constitutes a major challenge and may either lead to important progress in capacity and impact for the AU – or end in a new period of relative disillusionment and continued institutional weakness. Three of the RECs should be mentioned when it comes to institutional strength and capacity within the field of democracy and human rights – ECOWAS, EAC and SADC. These three sub-regional bodies seem to constitute increasingly capable actors at several levels and could merit enhanced support.

Also regarding the strength of specialized regional and sub-regional human rights judicial organs the tendency has lately been encouraging. This is mainly evidenced in terms of their relatively enhanced capacity in receiving and considering individual complaints as well as state and CSO reports. For example, during the year 2016 alone, regional and sub-regional judicial and quasi-judicial human rights bodies in Sub-Saharan Africa together passed more than 50 decisions, which represent a significant increase from previous years.[19]

[18] The Polity IV Project (www.systemicpeace.org). The figure of 40% increased with 15% in 2015, when Nigeria for the first time was classified as a democracy.

[19] The following bodies are included: African Council of Human and Peoples' Rights (ACtHPR); African Commission on Human & Peoples' Rights (ACHPR); East African Court of Justice (EACJ); ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (CCJ), and; the SADC Tribunal.

*Portfolio level*

The portfolio is in line both with the strategy and the priorities defined in the operationalization plan. The focus is twofold: (a) enhancing respect for key African Treaties related to democracy, human rights and gender equality, and; (b) improving the democratic quality of general elections. In both areas, the results are to be achieved through capacity building and strengthening of selected regional and sub-regional actors.

Within the first area, a major flagship contribution (coordinated by the UNDP and the AUC) is now starting, aimed at facilitating the implementation of selected treaties at the national level, combining outreach legal services from the AUC level with support through actors at the country level (including Swedish bilateral strategies). A new major CSO program – led by Raoul Wallenberg Institute (RWI) and geared towards the strengthening of regional and sub-regional human rights justice mechanisms – is pursuing similar objectives and the two programs are intended to become mutually reinforcing. In addition, targeted support for good financial governance, the rights of the child and women's empowerment continue and is being increasingly intertwined with the mentioned efforts.

When it comes to the quality of elections, support continues for the African Union (Department for Political Affairs) and the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). Moreover, analytical studies have been undertaken for a review during 2018 with the purpose of sharpening the existing support and also identifying entry points within the political landscape which conditions the democratic quality of elections.

*Contribution level*

Swedish support for electoral observation (through the AUC and EISA) has continued to show tangible and positive results, contributing to more professional and long-term presence of African observation missions during all national elections held on the continent during 2017. These kind of missions played an important role in facilitating a smooth transition in Liberia, Lesotho, Angola and the Gambia. Moreover, the very fact that AUC and EISA had the capacity to send long-term missions twice to Kenya that same year is also in part attributable to Swedish support.

### 2.3.1 Objective 2.2: Enhanced capacity of civil society and media to work towards accountability and respect for human rights at regional level

*Development towards the strategy objective*

Contemporary legal restrictions on the civic space in Africa started in earnest when Ethiopia in 2009 adopted a law constraining the sector by, amongst others, capping foreign funding at 10% of an organization's budget and also imposing a limit on administrative expenses – with costs for training and advocacy included in this category. Since then, laws and policies restricting the formation and operation of CSOs have spread across East Africa and beyond, today including an increasing number of countries. The right to free speech is not only under attack but is also being rolled back and an increasing number of governments are restricting social media and internet access in an arbitrary manner.[20] Many CSOs, human rights defenders and journalists are facing an increasingly hostile and risky environment, where laws related to anti-terrorism, national security, public order and cyber security often are applied against them.[21]

The past years of this – rather unexpected and strong – repression have no doubt significantly reduced the strength and the capacities of CSOs and independent media, almost all over the continent. It is only recently that an increasing number of actors have started to get together in order to strategize on how best to address this new situation – improving their defence and preparing to retake the initiative. In this

[20] The Economist Intelligence Unit: *Democracy Index 2017.*

[21] Amnesty International, *Report 2016/2017*; Freedom House Report 2018: *Democracy in Crisis.*

context, innovative ways of how to resist internet restrictions and the use of social media are, for example, being developed.

*Portfolio level*

This area came into being under the new strategy (which became operational in the first quarter of 2017) and contributions directly focusing on this goal do not exist as yet within the portfolio. The initiatives mentioned in the operationalization plan related to CSOs and media (including efforts to counteract the shrinking space) have only partly started to take shape and will be further identified and appraised during 2019. The main reason for this deviation from the plan is simply understaffing, as no new recruitments have been made while the Embassy offices are being remodelled and expanded.

One major ongoing contribution should, however, be emphasized as clearly relevant in this context, namely the long-term support to the Afrobarometer. Preparations are currently also under way for a new five-year phase (2018-2022) of Swedish core support for this African network (and think tank) whose production of reliable surveys, analysis and dissemination of African public opinion constitutes an essential part of the infrastructure required in the defence of democracy and human rights, facilitating for CSOs and the citizenry to keep governments accountable.

*Contribution level*

Launched in 1999, Afrobarometer aimed to *"Let the people have a say"* on issues of democracy, governance, and development. At that time, the voices of ordinary Africans were muted and little solid knowledge existed about popular attitudes and wishes in relation to democracy, governance and development. Since then, Afrobarometer has built a pan-African network of social science researchers and has done more than 250,000 interviews with African citizens in 37 countries. The network has contributed to reframing political and policy debates on the continent by introducing the perspectives of ordinary citizens and has built an international reputation as the most trustworthy source of information about African public opinion. These achievements – which partly are attributable to the continuous Swedish support – were recently reconfirmed by an external evaluation, which also gave good notes to the network concerning its efforts to modernize and become financially more diversified.[22]

## 2.4 Area of Support 3: Better opportunities and tools to enable poor and vulnerable people to improve their living conditions

### 2.4.1 Objective 3.1: Strengthened opportunities for increased economic integration and trade

*Development towards the strategy objective*

Economic integration in Africa is, as always, showing progress in some areas while new challenges emerge in others. Negotiations towards the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) continued during 2017, and a framework agreement is expected to be signed by some countries at an extraordinary AU Summit in March 2018. It should be kept in mind that much work remains in terms of negotiating actual tariff phase-downs, etc. While the main focus of economic integration must be at national level implementation of sub-regional arrangements, where great challenges still exist, it is possible that the CFTA can bring some benefits to certain countries on the continent in the medium to long-term perspective. Improved trade facilitation and infrastructure are key components for future success, with an interesting link to the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement that entered into force in 2017.

[22] *Evaluation of Afrobarometer's Regional Programme 2011-2017* (NIRAS, 2018).

The latest available statistics from UNCTAD show that the EAC improved its ranking on ”ease of trading across borders” from 150th to 133rd place. At the same time, intra-EAC trade as a share of total trade decreased from 23% in 2015 to 20% in 2016, and the costs of trading across borders was unchanged[23]. In the area of trade and agriculture/food security some east African countries suffered shortages of grain commodities, which led to increased prices and food insecurity. Kenya and South Sudan were hit the hardest. Some countries with grain surplus such as Tanzania, Ethiopia, Malawi and Zambia used export bans to safeguard domestic supply. The EU-SADC Economic Partnership Agreement became the first fully operational EPA in Africa in February 2018. The agreement includes six of SADC’s 16 member states. The EU is the largest trading partner of the SADC EPA countries. Meanwhile, China remains the continent’s largest trading partner.

*Portfolio level*

The portfolio is still deemed to be in line with the strategy and the OP, as well as perceived needs and demand in the region. Focus is on: a) Trade policy capacity building at the academic as well as technical level, and the availability of critical studies and platforms for dialogue; b) trade facilitation, through support to customs administration and border management agencies, including implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, and c) trade and agriculture, with a focus on food security, and with synergies with support area 1 on climate change. The geographical focus remains primarily East Africa, in a broader sense, i.e. the EAC and bordering countries. The efforts to consolidate the portfolio have continued during 2017 and are expected to be complete in 2019 in accordance with the OP.

*Contribution level*

A number of MTRs have taken place or are planned for 2018, and on the whole the contributions remain on course. The evaluation of the support to Tralac (Trade Law Centre for Africa 51050073) displays relevant activities, cost efficiency and good results. Areas of improvement include: a clear formulation of target group, results framework and integration of perspectives on poverty and gender. Budgeting and audit have been subject to discussions during 2017, and a new audit firm will be contracted for 2017/18. The MTR of support via the World Customs Organisation, WCO (51050065) is also showing positive results. WCO has taken on board some concerns raised during the year and have added resources to back up its management of one of the projects. The Trade Policy Training Institute in Africa (trapca, 51050096) have, after intensive discussions, improved their strategic thinking and planning, as well as the annual work plan and reporting. In 2017 a total number of 648 students from 34 SSA countries attended courses at trapca, 72 students graduated with an advanced post-graduate diploma and 14 students with an MSc in International Trade Policy and Trade Law.[24] The 2018 MTR will, a.o, provide recommendations on any future support to the centre, which has been dependent on Sida-funding since its establishment in 2006.

Support to the Eastern African Grain Council, (EAGC, 5105006004) has contributed to unlocking some of the restrictions in Ethiopia and Zambia on grain trade and facilitated flows to Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda contributing to more food security and trade. An MTR is currently underway, and will, inter alia, suggest how gender and environment mainstreaming can be improved. “Promoting Agriculture, Climate, Trade Linkages in the EAC II” (51050099), implemented by CUTS, has contributed to create conditions for more holistic agriculture policies taking into consideration trade and climate aspects as well as food security. For example support has been given to EAC WTO trade negotiators in Geneva on trade, agriculture and climate issues and UNFCCC climate negotiators. An MTR will take place during 2018. In line with the OP, support to Swedish Standards Institute’s activities in EAC and ECOWAS (51050034 and 51030047) were finalised during 2017.

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[23] World Bank Doing Business 2017, http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/trading-across-borders. numbers for 2017 are not yet available.

[24] Trapca 2018 Annual Work Plan and Budget

### 2.4.2 Objective 3.2: Improved conditions, especially for women and young people, for productive employment with decent working conditions

*Development towards the strategy objective*

Unemployment and underemployment in Africa remain a paramount challenge. Unless prioritized and well managed, poverty alleviation cannot be expected at a sufficient rate and, consequently, economic growth is likely to stagnate. This calls for intra-continental action, closer collaboration and eventually national policy implementation. As many as up to 15 million people on the continent are estimated to enter the labour market annually. Employment opportunities need to be productive to have a positive impact on poverty, to make a sustainable mark on the economy and in order to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal of inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.

On the continental level, as a response to the Ouagadougou 2004 summit, the AU's declaration on employment, poverty eradication and inclusive development has proved its priorities. However, it has been recognized that the past decades of sustainable and high growth has not been translated into proportionate job creation and thereby contributing to any significant reduction of unemployment and underemployment. A subsequent plan of action that recognizes the need of concrete measures promoting a framework on Jobs Creation, later led to the identification of a range of implementation challenges, e.g. the large number of strategies and recommendations, lack of financial resources, weak labour market institutions and poor coordination between concerned institutions, and the persistent weak political will and commitment, many of which still needs sufficient attention.

*Portfolio level*

The area of employment and decent work was introduced in the new regional strategy 2016-2021 which commenced mid-2016. In accordance with the Annual Plan 2017, that followed the operationalization of the strategy, and after the arrival of a programme officer in September 2017 responsible for the area, the task of building up a portfolio of contributions focusing on employment/decent work begun. An ongoing mapping study on Productive Employment with Decent Working Conditions within Swedish Bilateral and Regional Development Cooperation Strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa will be finalized by April 2018. It will guide Sida in its strategic direction of supporting regional interventions that, in line with the strategy objectives, promote productive employment with decent working conditions. With regard to future regional support, emphasis will be put on increased coordination and collaboration with planned and ongoing bilateral programmes supported by Sweden in order to amplify the effects on the country level. In addition, financial sector support at the regional level is being investigated as it is expected to have positive effects on private sector employment. However, while the context analysis is proceeding well, the actual identification and preparation of support has been delayed (as of April 2018) which explains the yellow level of the "traffic light". Sida is however confident that this delay will be addressed latest in 2019.

*Contribution level*

In addition to the employment/decent work mapping study, the dialogue with the African Guarantee Fund (AGF) continued in 2017 in line with the OP. Sweden's support through a USD50mn re-guarantee and a SEK34mn grant contribution for subsidizing the risk component of the guarantee premium has thus far resulted in 349 SMEs having benefited, whereas it is expected that a total of 918 SMEs will benefit from the existing re-guarantee upon expiry. With possible support through an extended Sida/AGF agreement regarding an additional USD20mn re-guarantee for SMEs' increased access to finance, as well as a requested grant contribution of USD3mn for a capacity building, monitoring and evaluation component, AGF expects that a total of 9,300 jobs will be created. Presently there is no clear indication to what extent that figure targets women and young people. Sida is hence in the process of assessing whether it will have the desired effects on productive employment with decent working conditions and be sufficiently cost-effective in comparison with the alternatives that are expected from the mapping study.

### 2.3.3 Objective 3.3: Strengthened capacity for regional actors to work towards sustainable solutions concerning refugee situations and migration flows, and embrace the positive effects of migration

*Development towards the strategy objective*

In today's increasingly interconnected world, international migration has become a reality that touches nearly all corners of the globe. It is also a phenomenon that has been ongoing since ancient times. Throughout its history, Africa has experienced migratory movements, both voluntary and forced, which have contributed to its contemporary demographic landscape. Cross-border migration in Africa is an important livelihood and coping strategy during times of ecological and economic downturn. In addition, for Africa, a remittance generated by migration has significant economic importance. However, migration is increasingly associated with a number of challenges including violations of migrant rights on transit and in destination countries and growing xenophobic behaviour in some countries. The main drivers of migration on the continent are poverty, conflict, unemployment fuelled by fast increasing youth population and impacts of climate changes. In order to address the challenges posed by migration and its ramifications, it is vital to devise a policy framework that promotes safe, orderly and regular migration on the continent. To this end the AU has taken a number of steps, among which the recent adoption of the ''Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community relating to free movement of persons, right of residence and right of establishment''. AU has also revised its Migration Policy Framework and formulated a 10-year action plan for its implementation to incorporate the dynamic nature of migration, and the changing migration trends and patterns. The framework encompasses a wide range of issues such as Joint Labour Migration Programme (JLMP) mentioned below and diaspora engagements, border governance and irregular migration among others.

*Portfolio level*

As well explained in the OP, the sub-result area 3.3 "Strengthened capacity for regional actors to work towards sustainable solutions concerning refugees and migration flows, and embrace the positive effects of migration" is new to the strategy. Accordingly, the Annual Plan 2017 was fully dedicated to identifying potential partners in the area of migration. Based on this, the Joint Labour Migration Programme (JLMP) of the AU was found to be one of the initiatives relevant for support. Sida has completed the initial assessment of the three-year JLMP contribution, which will be fully operational in 2018. In addition, Sida established a partnership with Statistics Sweden (SCB) for building the capacity of the AU and three RECs (ECOWAS, SADC and EAC) in the area of migration statistics.

Strengthening remittance flows on the continent is another focus area of the Annual Plan 2018. Initial discussions were held alreadyin 2017 with the African Institute for Remittance (AIR) and the UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) to explore their experience and capacity in the area of facilitating remittances on the continent, inter alia by decreasing the transfer costs, but also by using new technology (mobile phones and social media). Lastly, networking with partners working in the area of humanitarian assistance and refugees started in 2017. Initial discussions were held with UNHCR (the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and the AU Commission's Department for Political Affairs, in order to identify their engagement in the area. Based on the information obtained from the initial discussions, further explorations will be undertaken and finalized in 2018, after which support to this area will be appraised.

*Contribution level*

As 2017 was fully devoted to the exploration of potential partners, there were no specific contributions that produced results during the strategy reporting period.

## Area of Support 4: Human Security and Freedom From Violence

### 2.4.3 Objective 4.1: Strengthened capacity of regional actors for peace and reconciliation

*Development towards the strategy objective*

The extent and effects of political violence and conflicts on the continent continued to increase in 2017. In this regard, there have been continued armed conflicts in several countries most notably in Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Sudan. The drivers of these conflicts have been contestation over political power, ideological divides, ethnic divisions, electoral manipulation, exclusion, etc. In addition, the continent has seen civil unrest and protest in several additional countries including Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, and Togo. The drivers of these conflicts range from political contestation, resource competition, poor service delivery, corruption, manipulation and changing of constitutions. Notably, in Tanzania the space has shrunk significantly with regards to human rights including freedom of speech and a free press, human rights defenders and civil society, a worrying trend that may destabilize East Africa if it continues. The difficult civil war in South Sudan has seen additional conflict actors emerge, and continued to spread into parts of the country previously spared from violence, thus undermining the efforts made for implementation of the ARCSS peace agreement of 2015 by the AU, IGAD and the international community. Two other centres of armed conflict on the continent, severely affecting stability of its neighbours, remain Mali and DRC. Both MNJTF and G5Sahel remain important actors for stabilization of the Sahel and Lake Chad basin. In DRC armed conflict flared up in the southern parts of the country (Ituri) after many years of relative calm while conflicts in the east continued, the UN declared the country a so-called L3-crisis, while also pre-election demonstrations and discontent at the end of 2017 and beginning of 2018 lead to many civilian deaths. Unrest in connection with national elections and the debate on 'third termism' have continued to dominate the political situation in many African countries, such as Burundi, Uganda, and DRC.

At the same time, there were also encouraging developments is some countries towards peaceful transition of power, and efforts towards the resolution of long standing conflicts. A case in point was the 2017 presidential election in Somalia which was held more or less peacefully and has brought about the much sought after hope towards fully functioning federal government in the country. Similarly there were peaceful transitions of power in Angola and Liberia.

The role of the African Union, and the Regional Economic Communities/ Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) in responding to conflicts continued to feature prominently during 2017, despite ongoing discussions about the most efficient, and effective way for them to partner and collaborate at all levels. On the other hand, in the context of institutional capacity in Africa to respond to conflict, indicated a number of systemic challenges confronting the organizations in their efforts at meeting the objectives, including in peace and security. The issue of capacity and technical expertise is emerging as a critical challenge as the organizations' functionaries rely on external resources. Another key challenge is the speed with which the organizations implement their decisions especially in relation to instances of conflict.

*Portfolio level*

In line with the operationalization plan and annual plan 2017, the work of reorientation and consolidation of the portfolio has begun. In this regard, decisions have been taken to phase-out some of the core supports and to reorient some contributions through programme support to respond to the directions envisaged in the operationalization plan, namely the support to strengthening capacities for mediation, early warning, and post conflict reconstruction. However, these contributions have not yet been operationalized due to prolonged dialogues with the partners and delays in the implementation of the evaluation and efficiency audit (re support to ACCORD) that are supposed to provide input for the assessment and decision on the contributions. Despite these challenges, it has also been possible to renew supports to selected strategic partners and in these regard three contributions are up and running as planned. In addition, with some contributions closed during the year, the portfolio has been relatively streamlined with the objectives in the operationalization plan and the number of contributions per programme managers is expected to reach a reasonable level.

*Contribution level*

Important milestones have been met with the implementation of the flagship contributions in the portfolio. It is worth mentioning the developments with regard to strengthening mediation capacities within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Particularly, the operationalization of IGAD Mediation Support Unit is progressing very well. The Swedish support to the organization has contributed to the development of the regional strategic guidance on mediation and preventive diplomacy. The validated document provides general principles on how mediation is initiated, conducted, concluded and post-mediation processes undertaken.[25] Moreover, in collaboration with the African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), IGAD has been providing capacity building support to sub-regional and national mediation bodies, and networks for experience sharing established between IGAD Roster of Mediators, AU Panel of the Wise and the other regional and continental similar structures.

The support through the AUC Salaries fund has been seen as an important component in strengthening the institutional capacity required to implement the APSA roadmap 2016-2020. However, in light of the new focus of the Swedish strategy along with the need to cut the number of contributions in order to make space for new sub-objectives, this support will be phased out and terminated after 2018. Several other donors (EU, NL) have been questioning the usefulness of contributing to the salaries, as there has not seemingly been a shift of incremental increase in AU MS funding. The EU board of auditors (end of 2017) recommended that EU not fund purely salaries, but should be funding programmes (where salaries may be a component). As international partners/donors are still (April 2018) awaiting the Mid-Term Plan for 2018-2022, there is much uncertainty what will happen after 2019. The long-term plan for financing PSD staff is therefore still unclear, which may put the effective implementation of the APSA roadmap at stake.

At both regional and national levels, WANEP has enhanced its early warning and early response systems in view of the growing threat of violent extremism in west Africa and also contributed to enhanced capacity to support ECOWAS early warning and the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and civil society groups that need WANEP inputs for response purposes. It has also been reported that despite the increase in extremist attacks, violence in Togo, elections in Liberia and election campaigns in Sierra Leone, WANEP and partners' enhanced early warning and response mechanisms contributed to reduction in the number of violent incidents in West Africa.[26] The Swedish support for WANEP has played a crucial role, as it is a core support through a donor fund in order to support all the organization's activities, including national networks. In this regard, local and community stakeholders in 9 countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Benin, Sierra Leone and Liberia)

[25] IGAD PSD Annual Report 2017.

[26] According to WANEP Early Warning System, the number of violent incidents in the 15 ECOWAS member states decreased from 4,872 in December 2015 to 3,743 by December 2016 and as at the end of 2017, the incidents dropped to 3,021.

have better insights into Early Warning through hotspot mapping, Election Situation Room, National and Regional level Election Response Groups, and are using knowledge to prevent potentially volatile situation from escalating to violent incidence; hence the reduction of violent cases.

### 2.4.4 Objective 4.2: Strengthened capacity of regional actors to combat violent extremism

*Development towards the strategy objective*

Overall, acts of terrorism remain prevalent on the continent and should be seen in light of the regional centres of instability as described above (2.5.1). The presence of terrorist groups (Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, AQMI, and recently IS) continued to challenge peace, stability and human security in these parts of the continent. This development coincided with an increased flow of refugees, migrants and related organized crime. Lake Chad Basin/BH affected areas had been termed a “forgotten crisis” in 2015 by Under-Secretary General/Head of OCHA Mark Lowcock, and international response continued to be slow in materializing in 2017 for humanitarian, stabilization and development activities.

Some positive developments related to this strategy objective include the establishment of the IGAD Centre of excellence on CVE in Djibouti, its operationalization and staffing. Moreover, regional PVE strategy of IGAD was developed. The AU:s process for up-dating the existing AU PVE Plan of Action (from 2002) was expected to be finalized by January 2018. ECOWAS considered inclusion of PVE in its existing CVE Strategy and reviewing its Plan of Action.

*Portfolio level*

The mix of contributions for this component of the portfolio is assessed to be in line with the operationalization plan. Swedish support in the area consists mainly of support to UNDP Prevention of Violent Extremism in Africa, along with support to think tanks (ISS, LPI, ACCORD) for carrying out studies, workshops and related activities in the field. Specific achievements include policy discussions and technical support of UNDP to the processes of AU/REC:s mentioned in the previous paragraph. Likewise, the work of LPI contributed to evidence-gathering and evidence-based policy discussions on programming effectiveness in P/CVE, and explored at the linkages between P/CVE and peace-building thinking and best practices. The knowledge generated will form a basis for better adjusted programming.

*Contribution level*

The Swedish contribution to UNDP was crucial to get their multi-year, regional programme started, generate an evidence-base, gain traction and attract funding from other donors. Swedish contribution to UNDP amounted to a total of 24 MSEK in 2017 (cf. 15 MSEK in 2016) for regional components of the programme as well as research and evidence-building. 8 MSEK of these funds were dedicated to activities in the Lake Chad Basin, including starting a recruitment process towards the end of 2017 of an expert to sit inside the Lake Chad Basin Commission to provide technical assistance in the field of prevention of violent extremism (PVE). Swedish funding resulted in the study “Journey to Violent Extremism in Africa” that was launched in Stockholm in September, and subsequently launched in a number of European capitals and gained much international attention. Also, the UNDP photo exhibit accompanied by the individual testimonies of survivors of PVE (“Survivors”) was displayed at Fotografiska and in European Parliaments during the last quarter of 2017.

### 2.4.5 Objective 4.3: Increased influence and participation by women and young people in processes for peace and reconciliation

*Development towards the strategy objective*

The participation of women in formal peace processes on the continent remains very weak. Young people are normally not involved at all. For example, the peace talks for CAR in Rome in 2017 did not include one single woman, even though women's organizations are important mediation actors in the central African communities, and in May 2017 successfully negotiated a local agreement in Bambari. In Mali, all 37 individuals proposed for interim local authorities in the northern regions were men. In DRC, there were only 3 women out of the 32 participants in the political dialogue organized by the National Episcopal Conference of Congo, at the end of 2016 (leading to the "New Year's Agreement of 2016 to be implemented during 2017).[27]

*Portfolio level*

The nature of the few examples of women and youth participation in peace processes or reconciliation is generally at grassroots level. Hence it has thus far been difficult to identify one partner (or umbrella organization) to partner with in order to support this component of the strategy, and efforts will be on-going in 2018 for the operationalization of this sub-objective. Support to the AUC Salary fund included support to the mediation unit that was supposed to be launched, but establishment did not materialize. The launch of FemWise (as part of the Panel of the Wise) in the last quarter of 2017 was an encouraging mile stone as an African women mediator network. During a meeting in Constantine, Algeria, in December 2017, FemWise and its broader grassroots base came together to discuss matters of mediation and adopt the work plan which can serve as a basis for programming in support of strengthening the network. On the other hand, efforts were made during the year to better mainstream the women and youth in peace and security agenda in the existing contributions through dialogue with the partners and the assessment of new/renewed contributions.

*Contribution level*

A specific contribution is yet to be identified, in accordance with the operationalization plan. However, components of support to women and youth in peace and / or reconciliation processes are included in on-going support to partners including Insitute for Security (ISS), Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), Life and Peace Institute (LPI) and IGAD.

## 2.5 Implications for the Continued Strategy Implementation

The context for the implementation of the regional strategy has not changed markedly since the operationalizing the strategy in early 2017 and no major changes are being considered at this stage in the implementation. A Mid-Term Review ( MTR) of the strategy implementation is planned for 2019 and this review will guide potential new directions for the implementation of the regional programme. Some minor delays have been experienced in developing the portfolio compared to the operational plan. These delays have occurred in areas new to the regional strategy and have been indicated by yellow traffic lights at the portfolio level, see p.1. The regional section is looking at a reduction of human resources during 2018, in comparison to the forecasted resources used to develop the operationalization plan. As a result of this some contributions have been downgraded to priority 2 in PlanIt and some changes or additions have to be made in order to align the disbursement plan with the strategy allocation. These adjustments will be done during the first half of 2018.

[27] Information obtained from UNOAU, Addis Abeba.