

Summary of the Development towards the Strategy Results and the Implementation of the Contribution Portfolio

Overall Assessment of the Development towards the Strategy Results and Implementation of the Contribution Portfolio				
Year		2014	2015	2016
Overall Assessment of:				
Assessment of the development towards the strategy results*				
Assessment of implementation of contribution portfolio**				
Overview: Assessment of the Development towards the Strategy Results and Implementation of the Contribution Portfolio per result				
1. Strengthened democracy, greater respect for human rights and a more fully developed state under the rule of law - focusing on strengthened public administration and judicial systems		2014	2015	2016
Result 1: An efficient public administration with administrative capacity to implement reforms for closer relations with the EU, with emphasis on fundamental rights.	Assessment of the development towards the strategy results			
	Assessment of implementation of contribution portfolio			
Result 2: A more efficient judicial system that better guarantees the right to a fair trial in accordance with European standards.	Assessment of the development towards the strategy results			
	Assessment of implementation of contribution portfolio			
Result 3: A reduction in gender based violence	Assessment of the development towards the strategy results			
	Assessment of implementation of contribution portfolio			

	Assessment of implementation of contribution portfolio			
- focusing on increased enjoyment of human rights and greater opportunities to exercise democratic influence		2014	2015	2016
Result 4: A more pluralistic civil society, with strengthened popular support which promotes democratic accountability.	Assessment of the development towards the strategy results			
	Assessment of implementation of contribution portfolio			
Result 5: Turkey better fulfils its international commitments on human rights, gender equality (including the EU's strategy for equality between women and men) and non-discrimination.	Assessment of the development towards the strategy results			
	Assessment of implementation of contribution portfolio			
Result 6: Women and men have to a greater extent, the same power to shape society and their own lives.	Assessment of the development towards the strategy results			
	Assessment of implementation of contribution portfolio			

Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions and Recommendations for the Remaining part of the Strategy Period

- Longer term contributions for when the EU accession process has been revived should focus on civil society organisations (CSOs) in the areas of gender equality, LGBTI rights, human rights & democracy.
- Balance the above with increased flexibility with a focus on supporting CSOs survival in the short-term.
- Support to the GoT should have a strong Swedish political priority (e.g. migration) and a clear Swedish comparative advantage.
- Continued focus on implementing the *Feminist Foreign Policy*, with gender integrated in the whole portfolio as well as through specific contributions.
- Seek synergies with the *Strategy for the Syria Crisis* where possible, and of common benefit to both strategies.

1. Context Analysis

When the strategy for Western Balkans, Turkey and Eastern Europe (hereafter the strategy) was developed, including during the operationalisation of the strategy, Turkey was more or less on track with the EU-accession process. The operationalisation documents show plenty of optimism and are largely based on a continued peace process between the Government of Turkey (GoT) and PKK, as well as an intensified dialogue between the GoT and civil society. Furthermore, the strategy has a strong focus on strengthening the GoT in order to achieve EU accession. None or very few of the assumptions made during the operationalisation in 2014 are valid in 2017.

The deterioration of the political situation has had great impact on the reform process (see below). Since 2014 Turkey's EU accession progress has, more or less, come to a halt and/or reversed. The EU in 2016 assessed progress on chapter 23 on Judiciary and fundamental rights as backsliding¹.

The constitutional amendments made in 2010, the first brick of paving the way for extended presidential powers have been re-enforced during the last 2-3 years, starting with allegations of corruption in 2013, the Gezi protests, and continuing through the conflict with PKK and DAESH, and culminating after the coup. Through the State of Emergency established after the coup Turkey has become more and more authoritarian, which was further cemented in the 16 April referendum where just over 50% of the population voted yes to extended presidential powers, making Turkey's Presidential system similar to that of Russia's. It is still too early, however, to draw any major conclusions on the consequences for Swedish development assistance.

The peace process with PKK ended after the first election in 2015, when HDP (Kurdish Party) gained over 10% of the votes and blocked a single majority for the AKP. Shortly after that violence broke out from both sides (GoT & PKK), which resulted in an AKP majority. Since then the conflict has escalated, through violence and curfews, and it is estimated that there are at least 500,000 IDPs from the Southeast within Turkey². The South-eastern parts of Turkey were already among the poorest areas of Turkey, and the intensifying conflict, curfews and forced displacements have greatly worsened the situation for the population in the area. The conflict has also moved west where PKK and affiliated organisations have undertaken several attacks, targeting the GoT but harming and killing civilians as well. The Turkish involvement in Syria, changing from an open border policy to sealed borders, including military involvement inside Syria, has also made the whole country vulnerable to terror attacks (DAESH), which has been proven several times. The latest being the New Year's attack at a night club in Istanbul.

The attempted coup on July 15 2016 made the situation deteriorate even further, and since then a state of emergency has been in place. The GoT quickly identified *the Gülen movement* as the group behind the coup attempt, and embarked on a mission to find the Gülenists in the public sphere. Since then, more than 135 000 people, mainly within the bureaucracy, army, police, judiciary and the education sector have been dismissed and/or put in detention alleged of being part of the Gülen movement³. This has to a large extent drained the above sectors of capacity, which in turn has slowed down implementation of EU-supported projects.

Furthermore, the above events and the state of emergency have been used to crack down on any opposition to the GoT. This includes civil society, media and freedom of expression in general, and academia. Around 1000 NGOs and 149 media outlets have been closed down for alleged ties to one or the other of the mentioned organisations (DAESH, PKK, Gülen)⁴. In addition, same arguments are being used towards individuals within politics, academia, civil society, human rights and journalism who are either dismissed from their jobs or sentenced to jail for alleged terrorist activities. Turkey now has 148 imprisoned journalists⁵, and self-censorship has become the norm.

Before the attempted coup the space for civil society was already limited, but since then it has become minimal and interaction between the Government and civil society has mainly happened through, so called, Government NGOs (GONGOs). Partner's that used to have a dialogue with the GoT are now side-lined, and in some cases even keep a very low profile in order not to attract the attention of the GoT. In parallel to the shrinking space, conservatism has been on the rise since 2013. Within Sweden's areas of cooperation this has been most prominent within the area of gender equality, where

¹ EU progress report Turkey 2016.

² Amnesty Annual Report Turkey 2016/2017.

³ Human Rights Joint Platform report, 23 FEBRUARY 2017

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Human Rights Watch Turkey-Silencing the Media, 2016.

family values take precedence over the individual woman's rights, driven by both government rhetoric and the work of Government NGOs (GONGOs).

Due to the political turmoil and security concerns the Turkish economy began a downward spiral in 2015, which has intensified after the coup. The Turkish Lira has lost 20% against the USD; unemployment is at its highest since 2010 at 12.1% (22.6% among youth 15-24); and, revenues from tourism (5% of GDP) decreased by 40% during 2016, a figure that is likely to decrease further in 2017. The inflation rate stands at 9.22%, almost twice the GoT target of 5%, and the expected growth rate has been lowered from 3.3% to 2.7% by the World Bank. Experts foresee that the economy continues to fall, which will, sooner or later, have an impact on the population⁶. This could indirectly have consequences for the programme, as poverty could spread to areas that used to be "more well off", e.g. the coastal areas where people are dependent on tourism.

In 2017 Turkey hosts approximately 3 million Syrian refugees within its' borders. Most refugees live in the south eastern parts, the poorest areas which are also affected by the internal conflict, but there are also substantial numbers in the main cities throughout the country. The EU Turkey Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) was established to support Turkey in hosting (integrating) Syrian refugees, at the same time as preventing entrance to Europe. The FRIT agreement includes 3 Billion Euros and focuses on cash transfers, education and health for the Syrian population. To date, the FRIT has contracted and disbursed approximately 2.2 Billion Euros. So far, there have been surprisingly few clashes between refugees and the host population. However, as savings run out for the Syrian refugees, at the same time as the Turkish economy depreciates and the conflict with PKK extends, the risk for clashes and hostilities will increase. The refugee population is already considered among the most vulnerable and their situation is not expected to improve in the short to medium term. Finding synergies with the Syria Crisis Strategy could be a way for Sweden to try and mitigate risks of violence between refugees and host communities in the most affected areas.

Sweden is still the only bilateral donor to Turkey and the EU accession process. However, there are several actors (bilateral, INGOS, multilaterals) based in Gaziantep working on cross-border operations inside Syria. In addition, the UN-system and IFI:s have beefed up their operations to implement EU-funded projects targeting Syrian refugees in Turkey. There is also a tendency for (Turkish) NGOs to work more and more with Syrian refugees, as this is where funding is available. Most of Sweden's partner organisations receive additional funding from other sources to implement projects targeting Syrian refugees. Therefore, it is important that Sweden ensures that partners continue to focus on the outcomes that were agreed upon in the agreement.

2. Swedish Priorities for Development Cooperation

In 2013-14 Turkey was progressing towards EU-membership, the peace process with the PKK was ongoing, and there was an increased dialogue between the Government and CSOs. Focus was to be on strengthening government reforms to achieve EU accession. The main deprivations were found across all sectors for women and girls, i.e. lack of opportunities & choice, power & voice, as well as access to resources. Hence, the strategy has a strong focus on gender equality and gender mainstreaming of all contributions. The situation for women and girls have not changed, but rather become even more difficult, due to conservatism, increased conflicts, and a declining economy amongst other factors.

The conflict in the Southeast as well as the post-coup state of emergency has further increased the polarisation of the country. Under the state of emergency the GoT has become increasingly authoritarian, and several other segments of society are now deprived of their rights, for example, politicians, journalists, academicians, human rights defenders etc. On an arbitrary basis individuals

⁶ D-post: ANKA/2017-02-17/1900

have been accused of supporting terrorism, and sentenced to many years in prison. There is no, or extremely limited interaction between the government and civil society.

Based on the above there is a need for some revisions of the portfolio in order to adjust to the changing context. Focus will be on preparing for a revived EU accession process, and new contributions will be sought within civil society, targeting the most affected sectors, e.g. human rights/democracy including freedom of expression. This also means that reform cooperation with the government as main beneficiary will have lower priority. Possibilities of geographic focus to the areas affected by the conflict, and refugee affected areas, will also be looked into. The portfolio will continue having a strong focus on gender equality. Furthermore, the portfolio needs to be more flexible, which would in some cases entail shorter agreements with lower volumes.

Syrian refugees are amongst the most vulnerable groups in Turkey, and will stay so throughout the strategy period. The most important instrument has been, and will continue to be, the FRIT to which Sweden has contributed around 550 MSEK. However, there are questions whether the FRIT will reach the most vulnerable groups among the Syrian refugees, e.g. women, children, disabled, LGBT. As explained above, a majority of Syrians are settled in areas that are also affected by the conflict with PKK. As the only bilateral donor to Turkey there would be an added value for Sweden to work with all communities (Kurdish, Turkish, Syrian) in the Southeast, This would include some internal innovative measures in programming. Synergies with the *Syria crisis strategy* should therefore be looked into, e.g co-funding projects, where there are common areas of interest, i.e. *Reducing gender based violence* which is a result in both strategies.

Sida has been active in establishing a local SLSD network in Turkey. Synergies with strategy implementation have been created through engaging CSO-partners to hold a dialogue with Swedish companies represented in Turkey. An internal review of potential outcomes will be made during fall.

3. Financial allocation

Strategy period: 2014 – 2020

Use of country allocation				
Total amount for the strategy, in MSEK	n/a per financing code			
Disbursed amount total, in MSEK	n/a per financing code			
Undisbursed amount (of total), in MSEK	n/a per financing code			
Disbursed amount per area of support and year	2014	2015	2016	Totalt
1. Enhanced economic integration with the EU and development of market economy	0	0	0	
2 a Strengthened democracy, greater respect for human right and a more fully developed state under the rule of law - Strengthened Public Administration and Judicial systems	25.827	22.051	21.210	
2 b. Strengthened democracy, greater respect for human right and a more fully developed state under the rule of law -Increased enjoyment of Human Rights and greater opportunities to exercise democratic influence	35.795	53.811	36.850	

3. A better environment, reduced climate impact and enhanced resilience to environmental impact and climate change	0	0	0	
Non-committed amount, in MSEK	n/a per financing code			
Agreed amount in total, in MSEK	n/a per financing code			
Agreed amount per area of support and year (MSEK)	2017	2018	2019	Totalt
1. Enhanced economic integration with the EU and development of market economy				
2a. Strengthened democracy, greater respect for human right and a more fully developed state under the rule of law - Strengthened Public Administration and Judicial systems	12.123	4.200	0	
2b. Strengthened democracy, greater respect for human right and a more fully developed state under the rule of law - Increased enjoyment of Human Rights and greater opportunities to exercise democratic influence	37.747	19.785	5.517	
3. A better environment, reduced climate impact and enhanced resilience to environmental impact and climate change	0	0	0	

In 2014 Sida made an assessment to not work directly with justice reform, as it was deemed highly political, and *Domstolsverket* was not able to agree on areas of cooperation with the Ministry of justice. This meant that there was an increased focus on result 2b – Increased enjoyment of Human Rights and greater opportunities to exercise democratic influence. Due to the deterioration of the situation (see context analysis), focus on this result has increased and will continue to do so. Within result 2b priority will be given to CSOs, in the above mentioned areas. For that reason the Sida assesses funding levels as adequate, unless the situation drastically improves to allow for revived reform programming for EU accession with the GoT.

4. Assessment of Development towards the Strategy Results and the Implementation of the Contribution Portfolio

4.1 Overall assessment of Development towards the Strategy Results and Implementation of the Contribution Portfolio

Overall Assessment of Developments towards the Strategy Results and Implementation of Contribution Portfolio			
Year	2014	2015	2016
Overall Assessment of:			
Developments toward the strategy results			
Implementation of contribution portfolio			

Result area 1: Strengthened democracy, greater respect for human rights and a more fully developed state under the rule of law market econ

R 1: An efficient public administration with administrative capacity to implement reforms for closer relations with the EU, with emphasis on fundamental rights.

Assessment of: \ Year	2014	2015	2016
Developments toward the strategy results*			
Implementation of contribution portfolio**			

Indicators	Baseline 20XX	Actual value/change 2014	Actual value/change 2015	Actual value/change 2016	Target 20xx
Progress made towards meeting the accession criteria		a) The Ombudsman handles complaints continuously (5639 applications + 1528 cases from previous year /7169 cases a dressed) ⁷ b) National Human Rights Institution (TİHK) was appointed preventive mechanism under the OPCAT. c) The Foreigner's Act was enacted and DGMM took over migration issues. d) No further process regarding decentralization.	a) (6055 applications + 819 cases from previous year /5897 cases a dressed). ⁸ b) Preventive Mechanism under the OPCAT not yet functioning. ⁹ c) Further rationalization is required in the implementation of the Aliens Act. ¹⁰ d) No further process regarding decentralization. ¹¹	a) (5519 applications + 977 cases from previous year /4819 cases a dressed). ¹² b) The National Human Rights and Equality Institution (TİHEK) has taken over the role of national preventive mechanism, however, the institution has yet to become operational. ¹³ c) The Strategy Document and the National Action Plan on irregular migration approved in March 2015 was launched in November 2015. ¹⁴ d) No further process regarding decentralization. ¹⁵	

⁷ Ombudsman Activity Report 2014,

[https://www.ombudsman.gov.tr/contents/files/2014%20YILI%20FAAL%C3%84%C2%B0YET%20RAPOR-son\(1\).pdf](https://www.ombudsman.gov.tr/contents/files/2014%20YILI%20FAAL%C3%84%C2%B0YET%20RAPOR-son(1).pdf)

⁸ Ombudsman Activity Report 2015,

[https://www.ombudsman.gov.tr/contents/files/2015%20YILI%20FAAL%C3%84%C2%B0YET%20RAPORU\(1\).pdf](https://www.ombudsman.gov.tr/contents/files/2015%20YILI%20FAAL%C3%84%C2%B0YET%20RAPORU(1).pdf)

⁹ EU Commission, Turkey 2015 Progress Report , p.10

¹⁰ EU Commission, Turkey 2015 Progress Report , p.10

¹¹ EU Commission, Turkey 2015 Progress Report , p.10

¹² Ombudsman Activity Report 2016,

<https://www.ombudsman.gov.tr/contents/files/kdk-2016-yili-faaliyet-raporu.pdf>

¹³ EU Commission, Turkey 2016 Progress Report , p.70

¹⁴ EU Commission, Turkey 2016 Progress Report , p.78

¹⁵ EU Commission, Turkey 2016 Progress Report , p.12

Composite indicator of the government: a) Effectiveness b) Supervision c) Voice and accountability (0-100 scale where 100 is best)		a) 65.6 b) 65.1 c) 40.76, ¹⁶	a) 67.31 b) 66.35 c) 37.93 ¹⁷	Not yet published	
Rule of Law Index scales the practice of rule of law from 1 (highest) to 0 (lowest)		0.46, (ranked: 72/99) ¹⁸	0.46, (ranked:80/102) ¹⁹	0.43, (ranked: 99/113) ²⁰	
Corruption Perception Index scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean)		45 (Rank 64/175) ²¹	42 (Rank 66/168) ²²	41 (Rank 75/176) ²³	

The strategy result will not be achieved whereas the contributions are partially on track. Since the establishment of the strategy (and the operationalisation) the situation has worsened significantly, especially in the areas of Freedom of expression, fundamental rights and democratic space for civil society. The arbitrary dismissals and detentions have severely affected public administration, which has resulted in delays and decrease of ownership. Turkey has dropped significantly in both corruption and rule of law indexes since 2014, and the 2016 Turkey Progress report refers to backsliding in several instances. *“Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of public administration reform with a strong commitment to an open, responsive administration. However, there has been backsliding in the area of public service and human resources management in particular in the aftermath of the coup attempt. The structural impact on the functioning of the civil service of the measures taken after the coup attempt remains to be assessed... There is still no comprehensive reform strategy and political ownership. The continued politicisation of the administration and the low level of female representation in the higher echelons of bureaucracy, despite a slight increase in 2016, continue to be of serious concern.”*²⁴

Regarding the worsening rank in Transparency International’s (TI) corruption perception index TI last year commented: *“Also very worrying is the marked deterioration in countries like **Turkey** where we’re seeing corruption grow, while civil society space and democracy shrink. Corruption won’t be tackled until laws and regulations are put into action and civil society and the media are genuinely free.”*²⁵

Sweden’s efforts to strengthen the administrative capacity of Turkey’s public administration have focused on supporting to fundamental rights. Interventions have targeted the areas of capacity building

¹⁶ Se <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports>

¹⁷ Se <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports>

¹⁸ http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/files/wjp_rule_of_law_index_2014_report.pdf

¹⁹ http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/roli_2015_0.pdf

²⁰ http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/media/roli_withcover.pdf

²¹ <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results>

²² <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table>

²³ http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016

²⁴ EU EU Commission, Turkey 2016 Progress Report

²⁵ <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table>.

at central and local levels. The focus on Ombudsman Institute, municipalities, migration management system to be in line with European standards, and increase quality of service delivery. The ambition to strengthen accountability and transparency mechanisms along with mainstreaming gender equality in public administration was partially attained. Participation of CSOs on policy making and decision taking; introduction of new legislation and methods was weak.

Sweden has collaborated with UNDP on strengthening the capacity of the Ombudsman Institution²⁶. The OI has become increasingly politicised and it is not likely that the outcomes will be achieved. For example, the individual complaint mechanism of National Human Rights Institute (NHRI) has been cancelled and OI handles individual complaints upon its discretion. The absence of powers and the moderate criticism of the decisions, most notably on human rights violations in the east and south-east have reduced the effectiveness of, and the trust in the Ombudsman. The election of Ombudsman is criticized by the CSOs on grounds that it does not abide to Paris Principles. The willingness of cooperation between the state and civil society in building the capacity of the OI foreseen in the previous report is not likely to be achieved. One of the few positive outputs is that 21.546 decisions were taken out of a total case-load of 22.648 applications.²⁷ Turkey's human rights architecture via the centralization of the complaints handling mechanism is complicated further as the mandate between the OI and the NHRI (previously Turkish Human Rights Institute recently Turkish Human Rights and Equality Institute) is not clear.

Sweden's support to the migration management system in Turkey contributed greatly to the drafting and adoption of the new Law on Foreigners and International Protection through an IOM project. Support to DGMM (The Turkish Migration Agency) via the Swedish Migration Agency on administrative detention of irregular migrants, deportation, statelessness, human trafficking, and the rights and obligations of asylum seekers²⁸ produced several outputs e.g. a needs assessment for the DGMM was produced, principles of lean management were introduced, an international cooperation strategy of the DGMM was created. A new project will establish a Quality Assurance System implemented by DGMM in the coming years.²⁹ This contribution will promote an asylum examination process of high legal quality, which in turn will contribute to achieving fulfilment of migration related conditionalities set out in Chapter 24 of the Acquis, along with the requirements stipulated in the visa liberalization road map.

The support to the Union of Municipalities via Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting (SKL) ended in 2016³⁰. However, a regional contribution including Turkey has been initiated, managed by the Syria Strategy, the main reason being that many municipalities had come under increasing pressure due to the influx of Syrian refugees. The main achievements within the Sweden's support had been to integrate gender equality in the work of municipalities, as well as increasing citizens' participation in local decision making.

Conclusion: It was early on assessed not to work broadly with justice reform, but rather with smaller and less political contributions (e.g. OI). This seemingly worked until the attempted coup, when polarisation and politicisation increased even further, making political will questionable. Risks with regards to conservatism (gender equity) have also increased, and any contribution that has to do with

²⁶ "Strengthening the Institutional Capacity of the Ombudsman Institution", Contribution no: 55020222

²⁷ EU Commission, Turkey 2016 Progress Report , p.12

²⁸ "Strengthening the Capacity of the new Turkish Directorate General for Migration Management", Contribution no: 55020210

²⁹ "SMA quality assurance support to DGMM", Contribution no: 55020324

³⁰ SKL International, « Annual Progress Report for the TUSELOG Programme January-December 2015 », Contribution no: 53050031

either gender equality or freedom of speech need to be highly scrutinised. Under the current situation supporting public administration should be considered through CSO, and contributions with the GoT should mainly be considered at the local level. The exception being support to DGMM, where there is a mutual political interest between Sweden and Turkey, and where Sweden has a clear comparative advantage. Support should be considered to organisations working in the areas Freedom of Expression, human rights and democracy.

R 2: A more efficient judicial system that better guarantees the right to a fair trial in accordance with European standards

Assessment of: \ Year	2014	2015	2016
Developments toward the strategy results			
Implementation of contribution portfolio			

Indicators	Baseline 2013	Actual value/change 2014	Actual value/change 2015	Actual value/change 2016	Indicators
Access to justice, indicator 7.1 according to the World Justice Project (scale of 0-1 where 1 is the best)	0.54	0,54	0,47	0,46 ³¹	

The Turkish judicial system has been experiencing alarming developments since 2014 in an effort to remove alleged Gülenist elements from the judiciary. However retrogressive amendments to the legislative framework are affecting the institutions and services. There is increased executive control over the governing institutions, dismissal of judges and prosecutors and recurring violence and threats against lawyers. These developments highly contribute to the diminishing of human rights and the rule of law in Turkey.

The right of every individual to a fair trial, including through effective access to a lawyer were hindered during the State of Emergency. Presumption of innocence, the individual criminal responsibility, legal certainty, the right to defence, equality of arms and right to an appeal and the right of every individual to a fair trial must be ensured. The Commission set up as an appeal mechanism for the State of Emergency is still not operational. Over 100.000 applications to the Constitutional Court are pending³². The 2016 Turkey Progress report again refers to backsliding. *“Turkey’s judicial system is at an early stage/has some level of preparation. There has been backsliding in the past year, in particular with regard to the independence of the judiciary. The extensive changes to the structures and composition of high courts are of serious concern and are not in line with European standards. Judges and prosecutors continued to be removed from their profession and in some cases were arrested, on allegations of conspiring with the Gülen movement.”*³³

The Minister of Justice and his undersecretary as ex officio members continue to have substantial influence over the work of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). There is a need to limit the role and influence of executive power and the council should be safeguarded against any

³¹ <http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#/index/TUR>

³² https://bianet.org/bianet/toplum/183186-ohal-komisyonu-etkili-bir-hukuk-yolu-mu#_ftn4

³³ EU Progress Report Turkey 2016

political interference. The amendments to the structure and composition of the Court of Cassation (CoC) and the Council of State (CoS) are also questionable as they have an impact on the independence of the judiciary.

Sweden's focus on promoting mediation in civil disputes as an Alternative Dispute Resolution method (ADR)³⁴ continued with targets set out by the 10th National Development Plan (2014-2020) (par. 187) and the 2015 Judicial Reform Strategy (Target 3.3.). The 2016 TPR states that "ADR continued to be seldom used. Further steps are required to extend and promote alternative dispute resolution methods to help unburden the court. While mediation and various other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are in place, they are scarcely used. Sweden's contribution to Council of Europe (CoE) is to develop practical models of mediation while integrating best practices from international examples where possible. Mediation is encouraged as an ADR by pilot court judges, Bar Associations of the pilot provinces, and the Mediation Associations. In 2015, the number of cases solved through mediation has risen from 521 to 2053, with 91% of the solved cases coming from the 6 pilot provinces. The figure in 2016 has risen to 4625 with 125% increase in the pilot areas. Two more provinces have applied to be pilots in the project, and the Government of Turkey has contributed an additional 1 million TL to the project. World Justice Project's indicator for impartial and effective ADR for Turkey had risen from 2014 to 2015. It has a slight drop in 2016 but is at a high level in regard to the benchmarks. The Council of Europe experts have indicated their concern in a foreseen amendment in mediation practices where the mediator supplies a solution coined as evaluative mediation. Sweden has been especially vocal on the importance of the equality of arms principle in the practice of mediation, and the importance of mediation that protects women's rights and promotes gender equality.

A second significant contribution that was initiated in 2015 has been a contribution on legal aid³⁵ beneficiaries of which are the Union of Bar Associations and the Ministry of Justice, while the implementing organization is the UNDP. Aiming to standardize a system of high quality legal representation with respect to the specific needs of disadvantaged groups throughout Turkey, the project covers the areas of access to justice and the right to a fair trial. The project aims to update the present automated system for the appointment of lawyers in order to collect disaggregated data to help identify the legal aid needs of disadvantaged groups, with a specific focus on Syrian women and girls. The project has already achieved the formation of an Advisory Committee composed of representatives from leading NGOs and relevant state institutions working with Syrian refugees. Consultants have completed tours of the 6 pilot provinces in the South and have established focal points in state institutions and local NGOs and have recorded certain preliminary findings. The report for the Automation system is being drafted. Each of the five components of the program was gender mainstreamed, and the involvement of national and local women's human rights NGOs in the project has been secured.

Finally, support is given to the Raoul Wallenberg Institute (RWI) for the second phase of their program entitled the "Turkey Human Rights Capacity Development Programme 2015-2020"³⁶. After the coup and following the dismissals progress has come to a halt, or even reversed. The police academy has been turned upside down, so has the Academics of Human Rights Research Network due to dismissals. The justice academy also remains a difficult partner for the same reason. The agreement

³⁴ "Developing Mediation Practices in Civil Disputes in Turkey", TRAC ID: 55020206.

³⁵ "Support to the Improvement of Legal Aid Practices for Access to Justice for All in Turkey" Contribution no: 55020276

³⁶ "RWI Cap dev within human rights 2015-2017" Contribution no: 55020235

ends this year, and any decision on continuing the remaining period should look into possibilities of RWI to achieve results³⁷.

Conclusion: This result is the one that has been the most affected by the political turmoil and at the moment the EU-accession process is at a standstill. The strategy result will not be achieved and only the support to legal aid can be considered to be on track. A risk within ADR seems to have materialised, i.e. making family mediation mandatory, with a clear risk of putting family values before the rights of the individual woman. Out of RWI's achievements none or very few have been sustained. Future support to the result should focus on preparing for a revived EU accession process. This could include Government bodies, but should focus on CSOs. Support to organisations that work at the local level and/or organisations that work on supporting civil rights defenders could be considered as well.

R 3: A reduction in gender based violence

Assessment of: \ Year	2014	2015	2016
Developments toward the strategy results			
Implementation of contribution portfolio			

Indicators	Baseline 2013	Actual value/change 2014	Actual value/change 2015	Actual value/change 2016	Target 2020
Gender-based violence (Progress report)	Legislation and action plan against gender-based violence are implemented, the database of violence are under development ³⁸	Continued implementation of legislation on gender-based violence, and continued attention to violence – through the media ³⁹ .	Stalled implementation of legislation. Gendarmerie's capacity has been strengthened, but otherwise have stalled implementation. ⁴⁰	Discrimination against women and GBV were not sufficiently addressed owing to weak implementation of the legislation, low quality of services available and the weak political commitment to gender equality ⁴¹	

The situation regarding Gender Based Violence continues to be a main concern and very limited- or, no progress, or even regression since the establishment of the strategy. According to the EU 2016 progress report: “GBV is not sufficiently addressed owing to weak implementation of the legislation, low quality of services available and the weak political commitment to gender equality, exemplified by frequent public statements emphasizing gender stereotypes and promoting the traditional role of women. Domestic violence led to the death of 413 women in 2015. Female refugees, single women and pregnant women remained vulnerable. Early and forced marriage continued to be a major concern, including among the Syrian refugee population. Protection of women from violence and legal redress in cases where victims pursue judicial proceedings remained insufficient. The number of women who

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ EU progress report on Turkey 2013

³⁹ EU progress report on Turkey 2014

⁴⁰ EU progress report on Turkey 2015

⁴¹ EU progress report on Turkey 2016

seek formal help or report to the justice system is still very low. Milder sentences for sex crimes are justified by 'consent', 'undue provocation' and 'appearing older'. No system for collecting comprehensive data on gender-based violence exists. Shelters for victims of domestic violence increased their capacity, but they still need to be developed further. There is very limited administrative follow-up to cases of domestic violence and no link with social services."⁴².

The situation among Syrian women and girls is also unclear, but there are frequent reports on child marriage as a negative coping strategy for Syrian families in Turkey. From a general conflict perspective it could also be expected that many have suffered from GBV whilst being a refugee⁴³.

Sweden has supported Kaos GL⁴⁴ since 2014. The organisation has advocated for the inclusion of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status (SOGII) as hate crimes into national legislation, but unfortunately failed. The organisation also reports on hate crimes through their website, and through international platforms and mechanisms. Kaos GL also gives social and legal consultancies to 600-700 LGBTI applicants every year. There is also another consultancy service geared towards LGBTI refugees in 5 satellite cities in Turkey which reaches around 500 refugees every year⁴⁵.

One of the aims of Sweden's support to Bianet is to collect data on GBV. Since the data is gathered through secondary media sources it is far from providing an accurate picture and is most likely only the tip of the iceberg. However, as this is currently the only available source Sweden's support is highly relevant. In 2016 femicide numbers went down somewhat to 261 after relatively stagnant numbers during 2013(214) 2014 (281) and 2015 (284).⁴⁶

Despite long and plentiful curfews in the Southeast, KAMER⁴⁷ managed to continue its' work throughout 2015 and 2016. The number of women that approached KAMER for protection against violence was 726 for these two years. Notably, this number was above 1000 in previous years. However, due to the widespread general violence during curfews, women are believed to be less likely to report personal domestic violence, e.g. out of the 22684 women reached through house visits 91% believe that domestic violence is common, 30% thought that domestic violence was ok, while 50% thought people were afraid to report.

Conclusion: The strategy result will not be achieved, while the contributions manage to produce some results and are partially on track, especially in data collection on GBV, and hate crimes against LGBTI persons. The assessment is that the situation has gradually worsened in the country, that conservative public statements and rhetoric is likely to even further increase GBV in the country. There is no or limited dialogue between CSOs and the GoT, and most of the dialogue is through family oriented GONGOs (Government NGOs). The support to ADR (R2), provides a good example where conservatism may have a negative impact on parts of the result. It is important that Sweden continues to support the few good forces that still exist in the area, and possibly look for new collaboration opportunities, including possibilities to include men and boys to working on gender equality. As mentioned, there is also limited data on GBV among Syrian women and girls but numbers are likely to

⁴² Ibid

⁴³ <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sarabrynn-hudgins/a-chronic-problem-violence-b-13649898.html>

⁴⁴ The Rainbow Project" Contribution No: 55020105

⁴⁵ Kaos GL 2016 Progress Report

⁴⁶ Support to independent media 2013-2015' Contribution no: 55020101 & 'Support to independent media 2015-2018' Contribution no: 55020259

⁴⁷ "KAMER: An opportunity for every woman 2014-2017" Contribution no: 55020221

be high. Hence, synergies between the Strategy for the Syria crises and the Turkey strategy should be sought, as there is a common result on working against GBV.

R 4: A more pluralistic civil society, with strengthened popular support which promotes democratic accountability.

Assessment of:	Year	2014	2015	2016
Developments toward the strategy results				
Implementation of contribution portfolio				

Indicators	Baseline 2013	Actual value/change 2014	Actual value/change 2015	Actual value/change 2016	Target 20xx
Freedom House Civil Society Rating ⁴⁸ (1 – best 7-lowest)	4	4	4	4.5	

As described in the context analysis, Turkish civil society has come under increased political and financial pressure. Turkey still rates as partly free by Freedom House, however the overall rating has decreased from 4 to 4.5, which is quite significant in the Freedom House index.

Up to 2015 there was an increase in CSO's own efforts to stimulate and attract local funds. Independent and several CSOs had managed to build up collaborations with public agencies and institutions. However, these positive developments have now come to an almost complete halt or even reversed in the atmosphere of shrinking space that has emerged during the past years, culminating after the failed coup attempt of July 2016. While the pressure on civil spaces has increased overall, the possibilities to act vary by issue. The current environment is directly targeting academia, the free press, think tanks and other sectors of civil society, and many organisations have been closed down and individuals dismissed from their jobs and/or imprisoned. External financial and moral resources have been a lifeline for local CSOs and crucial for their endurance, not least those provided by Sweden, including from the Consulate General.

Independent media outlets and freedom of expression organisations (online & paper) have seen advertisement revenues drop dramatically, as the private sector are more reluctant to be associated with them, due to arbitrary accusations of terrorism and/or defamation of the nation. For many actors this has meant a shift from being a profit-making outlet to a non-partisan voice needing donor funding to survive. The Turkish intelligentsia has been heavily targeted as well. Academics have been dismissed, human rights departments at universities closed down, and think tanks have been threatened, which has led to many, either leaving the country, or operating under the radar.

Sweden provides core-support and programme support to a handful rights-based CSOs, mainly in the areas of gender equality, human rights, and LGBTI rights. Sweden's support to R4 is mainly managed by the Consulate General of Sweden in Istanbul (the consulate), which gives smaller support to primarily local CSOs. The Consulate's support has also functioned as "seed-money" to organisations for the Sida to take over and develop further (Bianet, Kader & WWHR are examples).

The consulate supports CSOs broadly and average volume and agreement length is 280000 SEK and 8 months, respectively. In spite of the harsh conditions, several new initiatives have been initiated at the

⁴⁸ Freedom House reports for 2013 och 2014, 2015 & 2016: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>

same time as established CSOs have been operational. The Consulates support has been crucial in sustaining CSOs, and increasingly so, as the space has shrunk and the pressure intensified for oppositional voices. Since 2015, the main aggregated result of the Consulate is supporting the survival of CSOs, especially after the attempted coup. However, individual projects have achieved concrete results such as the foundation of the first Armenian institute through the Hrant Dink Foundation, to a now leading press freedom advocate P24 – Platform for Independent Journalism, and to Bilgi University's Social Incubation Center which supports a multiplicity of new CSOs, all of which continue to be highly active. In addition, support to the election monitoring initiative Vote and Beyond during the parliamentary elections of 2015 increased the number of volunteers in the monitoring process, contributed to an overall increase among particularly young people in the voting process and to the fact that the elections ensued without significant shortcomings. Support to the Bilgi University.

The deteriorating situation within freedom of expression/press⁴⁹ as well as increased conservatism⁵⁰ has prompted the Consulate to support these areas further. The increasing social polarization in Turkey has made projects countering this trend another focal issue, with an emphasis on youth participation⁵¹. The situation for dismissed academics and closed down departments at universities has also demanded increased support.

Conclusion: The strategy result will not be achieved, whilst the contributions are partially achieving expected results. Under the current conditions in Turkey, support to civil society is crucial. The flexibility and ability of the Consulate to provide smaller support to civil society and the academic sphere is at the moment the only source of funding many organisations. In addition to funding, the international solidarity that comes with it is often priceless. Sida also sees the need to focus more on supporting CSOs, the academia and think tanks both from a short term “survival” perspective (within the most affected topics), and from a more medium to long-term perspective. This entails a more flexible approach between smaller and shorter contributions to longer contributions supporting an enabling environment for a revived and continued EU-accession process. However, the agreements should not be shorter than 2 years and volume not lower than 2 MSEK per year. To some extent, under the current circumstances quantity is quality when it comes to CSO support.

R 5: Turkey better fulfils its international commitments on human rights, gender equality (including the EU's strategy for equality between women and men) and non-discrimination.

Assessment of:	Year				
	2014	2015	2016		
Developments toward the strategy results					
Implementation of contribution portfolio					

Indicators	Baseline 2014	Actual value/change 2015	Actual value/change 2016	Target 2020	The Swedish contribution 2014-2016
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⁴⁹ P24; Dokuz8; Transparency International

⁵⁰ Association for the Struggle Against Sexual Violence; Women's Library and Information Center; Öz-Iplik Is

⁵¹ European School of Politics; Habitat; Dialogue for a Common Future

Share of seats in Parliament (Human Development Report)	14,2%	14,9% / 0,07 %	14,9% / 0,07 %	N.A	UN Women project KADER project
World Press Freedom Index (Reporters without Borders)	154 th	149 th / +5 in ranking	151 th / -2 in ranking	N.A	Bianet
ILGA – Europe Rainbow Index	14%	12% / - 2 %	9 % / -3 %	N.A	KAOS GL

As described in the context analysis, the human rights situation, including Freedom of Expression (FoE) has deteriorated tremendously since 2014.

With the end of Peace Process, the scale of human rights violations reached an unprecedented level. The Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) states *“that the domestic protection of human rights in South-East Turkey has effectively been non-functioning since at least July 2015, as demonstrated by the reported lack of a single investigation into the alleged unlawful killing of hundreds of people over a period of 13 months between late July 2015 and the end of August of 2016 (page 3). In total some 2,000 people were reportedly killed between July 2015 and August 2016, including local residents, amongst whom women and children, as well as close to 800 members of the security forces”*⁵².

The coup attempt of July 15, 2016 resulted in the Turkish government declaring a three month long state of emergency (SoE) which was renewed a third time on 4 January 2017 to continue until 19 April 2017. International NGOs such as Human Rights Watch documented vividly the increase in practices of torture in the immediate aftermath of the coup attempt⁵³, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, stated *“torture and other forms of ill-treatment seem to have been widespread in the days and weeks following the failed coup, particularly at the time of the apprehension and during initial detention in police or gendarmerie lock-ups as well as in unofficial detention locations,”*⁵⁴.

Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT), a long-term partner of Sweden in Turkey has come increasing pressure from political authorities for documenting human rights violations during curfews and during the state of emergency⁵⁵. There are numerous trials against the representatives or board members of HRFT and it is one of the most adversely affected NGOs among Sweden’s partners⁵⁶. Despite these extreme difficulties, HRFT still continues its work of rehabilitating torture survivors. 677 torture survivors were offered treatment and rehabilitation services at the HRFT centres in 2016. In some places such as Cizre which witnessed curfews and near total destruction in 2016, HRFT was the only NGO that had a representation to offer relief to local residents.

In parallel to the general deterioration of human rights scene in Turkey, there is significant backsliding in the area of freedom of expression as well. Those who engage in journalistic activities can easily be tried on anti-terror charges which are loosely defined in order to intimidate opposition media. The scale of intimidation of journalists reached such a level that a third of all jailed journalists in the world are from Turkey as we speak⁵⁷. In 2016, Turkey ranks 151th among 180 countries in the Reporters without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index⁵⁸. As of the end of 2015, there were 1953 cases opened for insulting

⁵² http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/TR/OHCHR_South-East_TurkeyReport_10March2017.pdf

⁵³ https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/turkey1016_web.pdf

⁵⁴ <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20977>

⁵⁵ http://tihv.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Cizre-G%C3%B6zlem-Raporu_31-Mart2016.pdf

⁵⁶ “Core Support to HRFT 2015-2019” Contribution no: 55020258

⁵⁷ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2017/02/free-turkey-media/>

⁵⁸ <https://rsf.org/en/ranking>

the president, some targeting ordinary citizens. This figure was only 132 in 2014⁵⁹. This has scared both citizens and media, and self-censorship amongst journalists has become the norm.

As space for freedom of expression is shrinking and Sweden's support to Bianet is increasingly important, being one of few independent media outlets still active in Turkey. Bianet provides rights-based unbiased news in Turkish, English and Kurdish, thereby making news available for both the international community and Kurdish minorities⁶⁰. Although risks are extremely high, e.g. the founder was recently tried and sentenced along with one of its' journalists, Bianet's activities are mainly on track, and they continue to be the only source for statistics on femicides.

All areas under human rights have experienced back-sliding, including LGBTI rights. *"The Law on Human Rights and Equality Institution of Turkey came into force on April 2016 without protection on grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status (SOGII). Demonstrating well the ideological position of the Government, the new law even leaves out protection on "similar grounds" as the old law used to have it. What was worse was the statement of the Minister of Justice, claiming that they would never add SOGII to the legislation because they were a conservative "democratic" government.*"⁶¹ KAOS GL received threats from DAESH during 2016, and decided to change office and keep a lower profile. Both the IDAHOT March in Ankara and the İstanbul Pride parade were banned during the year. As the space for dialogue with GoT diminished, KAOS GL invested more in private sector inclusion of LGBTIs, LGBTI refugee support program, media school for monitoring human rights, dialogue with LGBTI friendly local governments, human rights trainings to professionals, local meetings against homophobia as well as capacity building trainings and grants for local LGBTI organizations. KAOS also participated in a Turkey SLSD meeting, where ideas for LGBTI persons involvement in the labour market was discussed.

The main international commitments of Turkey on gender equality are CEDAW, ILO conventions, Council of Europe Convention Against Domestic Violence; the Istanbul Convention and the commitments towards the EU accession process and related national action plans and necessary laws and regulations in line with these. However the main issue throughout the reporting period has been the non-implementation of these commitments. *"Turkey's ratification in 2014 of the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, the country has not taken any concrete steps to harmonise its domestic legislation with the Convention and to raise awareness"*⁶². Many of the expected results for the contributions with Kader⁶³, UN Women⁶⁴ and ILO⁶⁵ have been either delayed or hampered as a result and all of them received no-cost extensions to their respective agreements. Kader has been severely affected from the political polarisation that turned into an internal conflict within the organisation. The UN Women Project on Gender Equality in Political Leadership and Participation in Turkey is also now severely delayed as the Parliament did not function at all (due to repeated elections) and the polarization between the political parties has stalled the activities. In the same vein, ILO contribution results were delayed due to the elections and political turmoil. However, one positive outcome of the ILO project is the production and acceptance of the National Gender Employment Policy document, which is mandatory under CEDAW.

Since 2008 Women for Women's Human Rights (WWHR) has provided 13000 women with human rights trainings with Swedish funds. However, both WWHR and Kamer⁶⁶, have been severely

⁵⁹ http://www.aihmiz.org.tr/files/Artun_ve_Guvener.pdf

⁶⁰ "Core Support to HRFT 2015-2019" Contribution no: 55020259

⁶¹ <http://www.kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=21474>

⁶² EU Progress Report 2016

⁶³ "Support to women's political participation Turkey" Contribution no: 55020093

⁶⁴ "UN Women Gender Equality in Political Leadership" Contribution no: 55020160

⁶⁵ "ISKUR/ILO WEE Main Phase" Contribution no: 55020158

⁶⁶ "Women for Women's Human Rights 2013-2015" Contribution no: 55020092 and "Women for Women's Human Rights 2016-2017" Contribution no:55020326

affected by shrinking space and conservatism, and there is no official dialogue between the organisations and GoT after the attempted coup. However, considering the circumstances both WWHR and Kamer have managed to implement activities and achieve some outputs through their trainings.

The contributions that are undertaken with government partners and or GoT as beneficiary have faced severe difficulties in implementation. A study on masculinities with the World Bank has been agreed but not yet materialised, mainly due to difficulties in working with the Ministry of National Education. The support to the parliament via UN Women⁶⁷ has not achieved any results, due to the political turmoil and difficulties working with parliament. Further difficulties were seen in the support to ILO, where the Government unemployment agency (ISKUR) was to be the implementing partner, but pulled out due to political conservative reasons⁶⁸. As an example of the changing attitudes of the GoT, the Minister of Family and Social Planning, which is the ministry that is responsible for family vs. gender equality policies, has changed 5 times in 4.5 years.

Conclusion: Although the strategy result will not be achieved Sweden's support is extremely important, as it is the only country with a bilateral multi annual programme apart from the EU. Given the shrinking space for human rights and freedom of speech organisations as well as gender and LGBTI-organisations, there is a need to continue and increase support to organisations active in these areas. There should be both a more "survival" (mainly in freedom of speech) support as well as a more long term strategic vision to supporting CSOs until the accession process is on track and a dialogue with the GoT is back on the agenda. Any new support to the GoT should only be considered possibly at local levels.

R 6: Women and men have to a greater extent, the same power to shape society and their own lives.

Assessment of: \ Year	2014	2015	2016
Developments toward the strategy results			
Implementation of contribution portfolio			

Indicators	Baseline 2013	Actual value/change 2014	Actual value/change 2015	Actual value/change 2016	Target 2020
UNDP Gender Inequality Index (0 - low inequality, 1 total inequality)	0,360 (69 th out of 187)	0,359 (71 st out of 188)	0,328 (69 th out of 188)	Not published	
Global gender gap index ⁶⁹	120 out of 136 countries	125 out of 145 countries	130 out of 144 countries	130 out of 144 countries ⁷⁰	

Gender equality in Turkey has decreased during the strategy period, which can be seen in the Gender Gap Index where Turkey has dropped from 120th place to 130th since 2013.

⁶⁷ UN Women Gender Equality in Political Leadership" Contribution no: 55020160

⁶⁸ "ISKUR/ILO WEE Main Phase" Contribution no: 55020158

⁶⁹ World Economic Forum Global gender Gap report 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016

⁷⁰ <http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2016/rankings/>

The employment rate of women has remained at a very low level. The overall employment rate increased to 53.9 % in 2015, with a large difference between men (75.3 %) and women (32.5 %). Despite the low proportion of women actively looking for work, their unemployment rate remains significantly higher than the unemployment rate for men. In addition, about one third of women who are considered to be employed are in fact unpaid family workers in the agricultural sector. Employment rates were 75.3 % for men (aged 20 to 64) and 32.5 % for women (20-64) in 2015, having increased slightly from 75 % and 31,6 respectively. The gender pay-gap remains problematic. Legislation on part-time work for working parents has been adopted. The lack of institutions and services to care for children, the elderly and sick people, including for long-term care, continue to hinder women's employment due to the gender bias for caring responsibilities. Women are slightly better represented in the public service than before, at 37.1 % in 2016 compared with 36.5 % in 2015. However, the percentage of women in senior managerial positions was only 10.4 % in July 2016 compared with 9.7 % in 2015. Following the general elections in November 2015, four parties obtained a representation in parliament. 82 women members were elected in the 550-seat Parliament.⁷¹

Since the establishment of the strategy, it has become increasingly difficult to work in the area, due to conservatism, shrinking space for CSOs, and GONGOs monopoly on dialogue and media coverage. This has led to family oriented policies taking precedence over the individual's rights, through rhetoric on gender justice and gender equity.

Work under R6 has mainly been undertaken by integrating gender equality in the whole portfolio and the portfolio focuses on empowerment of women in a variety of areas such as politics, access to resources, employability, demand for rights, GBV, decision making, economic empowerment etc. Sida has also tried to influence partners to work with men and boys, and social norms. However, during the current political situation almost no results have been achieved. Still, Sida will continue to look into possibilities to support men and boys' involvement in changing social norms in the coming years.

Conclusion: Same as for R6, as it is clear that the strategy result will not be achieved. It is also clear that working with government partners in areas of gender equality is problematic at the moment, while CSOs manage to be flexible and achieve some progress. New contributions should focus on supporting CSOs in the short- to medium term.

4.1.1 Concluding assessment Results Area 1

The results within the results area will not be achieved during the strategy period. Contributions are achieving results to varying degrees, but none are being implemented according to plan. Most have minor deviations, while some have serious deviations from plan. On a general level, the contributions with CSOs tend to work better than those where the GoT is a beneficiary and/or partly involved in implementation. The portfolio has so far had, roughly a 40/60 divide between multilateral organisations and CSOs, where the multilaterals work much closer with the GoT than the Government. Especially since the coup when dialogue between CSOs and GoT has been almost non-existent, particularly in the areas where Sweden is active. After the yes-result in the referendum it is highly unlikely that the situation will improve. Hence, the proportion needs to be further tilted, with a higher focus on civil society, through both short-term flexibility as well as medium- to long-term interventions, until we know what the EU-accession will look like.

The EU-accession process is, more or less, at a standstill. IPA implementation is delayed but ongoing, and the EUD in Ankara has decided to increase funding to civil society under the European Instrument

⁷¹ EU Progress Report 2016

for Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR) programme. The funding through EIDHR is far from sufficient, and Sweden should look into complementing the instrument in areas where there is an added value and/or where there is a strong political interest i.e. Freedom of Expression, human rights & democracy, academia & think tanks, gender equality and LGBTI rights. Funding to the GoT and multi-laterals, should decrease until we see progress in the EU accession process, and any contributions considered should have high political value (e.g. migration). Support to local level government could also be looked into, as there could be potential for results at this level.

Syrian refugees are among the most vulnerable in Turkey. The longer the war continues in Syria, the more vulnerable the refugees in Turkey become, as their savings disappear. The poorer they get, the higher the risk for conflicts between host community and the refugees. The integration process of refugees will take time and the FRIT will not be able, neither to cover all areas, nor to be flexible enough to handle smaller- to medium sized contributions. Hence, there are opportunities for synergies between the Turkey- and the Syria Crisis strategy, especially in areas of common interest and/or where the EU funding will not reach. One such area would be reducing gender based violence, which is a result in both strategies.

The feminist foreign policy should continue to be high on the agenda for Sweden in Turkey, not least through the development cooperation. The portfolio should continue to be fully gender integrated. Due to conservatism, internal conflicts and the state of emergency, the situation for women and girls have stagnated if not reversed. The same goes for the LGBTI population. Other groups that have become vulnerable after the coup and its' consequences are journalists, academics, human rights defenders amongst others. Support to the GoT in all these areas is unlikely to achieve results in the short-to medium term. Hence, support should be sought mainly through CSOs.

The work of the Consulate is highly important, and should be complemented by flexible funds from the Sida in prioritised areas.

5. Synergies with Other Swedish Strategies

Annual amount within other appropriation items that reach/es the country/region 2016:	X MSEK
Humanitarian assistance (Appropriation 1)	47 779
Support through Swedish NGOs (Appropriation 5)	1 422
Research assistance (Appropriation 32)	N/A
Guarantees	N/A

There are synergies with the Strategy for the Syria Crisis, as there are a few contributions that target Syrian refugees in Turkey. For example, the support to legal aid via UNDP to vulnerable groups has a specific component on Syrian refugees. A contribution to the World Bank includes a socio economic survey on Syrian refugees in Turkey, and support is provided to DGMM via the Swedish Migration Agency. As mentioned in previous reporting,⁷² there is potential for increased synergies between the humanitarian strategy, the Syria strategy & the Turkey strategy, as the Syrian refugee situation becomes more of an “integration project”. The Turkey team will together with the Syria team look into

⁷² Årsplan 2016

possibilities to work on results that are mutual, i.e. *To reduce gender based violence* in the coming years. For this to happen it is important that the current BBE position is made permanent in order to ensure that possible synergies are sustained.

6. Donor Context

Development assistance make up N/A of the national budget.	Sweden's share of the total of development assistance constitute N/A %.
Common donor strategy 20XX – 20XX signed by [X] donors N/A	Common EU Strategy is valid 20XX – 20XX Status of EU joint programming: N/A
The five largest donors (organisations or countries) are: N/A	Sweden is the X largest donor. Of the EU member states Sweden is the X largest donor.N/A

Except for the EU Sweden is the only donor with a programme supporting Turkey's EU accession process. Donor coordination is limited and coordination with the EU is limited to a few times per year. Sweden's comparative advantage is that it can complement the large-scale EU projects with smaller, strategic contributions. In particular this could be said for the areas of gender equality, LGBTI-rights, but also human rights and freedom of expression. Furthermore, due to the refugee crisis and the EU Turkey deal on refugees, Sweden can be said to be a less politically sensitive donor than the EU.

The donor landscape has, however, changed alongside the intensifying Syria crisis. Several donors are represented in Turkey, but they are limited to mainly cross-border activities and to a lesser degree activities focusing on refugees in Turkey. Coordination between the "Syria donors" is mainly done in Gazientep, and to some degree in Istanbul. However, many donors, including the UK and Sweden are setting up their regional hubs for the Syria crisis in Beirut.

7. Conclusions, Lessons Learned and Recommendations

7.1 Suggested Adjustments to the implementation of the Strategy

The strategy results will not be achieved. Reasons being that the limited Swedish funding hardly can affect changes at country level, and also the rapidly deteriorating situation in Turkey. Overall contributions are partially on track.

Support to the demand side should increase on behalf of the supply side, i.e. more focus on *Increased enjoyment of Human Rights and greater opportunities to exercise democratic influence* rather than focus on *Strengthened Public Administration and Judicial systems*.

Considering the results of the referendum it will be highly important to building the foundations of democracy, which can only be done by targeting those who voted yes. The majority of these voters are not from the main cities (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir etc.), not from the tourist areas along the coast, and not from the Kurdish dominated areas in the southeast, but rather from more rural areas of Anatolia and the nationalistic Black Sea region. In these areas the population is likely to be less educated, more conservative and poorer. Hence, there is need to increase support to support democracy at grass-roots levels. Moving outside the "usual circles" targeting those that voted yes will be a challenge but a

necessity for the long-term democratic development in Turkey. Long-term support should also continue in the areas of on gender equality, LGBTI rights and human rights.

In the short-term flexibility is needed to support organisations that are under high pressure at the moment. This includes the areas of freedom of expression, human rights, academia amongst others, This will mean a more contributions and lower volumes in the short term. However, agreements should not be below 2 MSEK and less than two years.

Support to central reforms with the GoT should be carefully scrutinised and only agreed if there is a high Swedish added value (e.g. migration), or in order not to lose traction for when the EU accession process is back on track (e.g. certain reforms regarding vulnerable groups).

One possible risk is that the EU accession process officially dies (unlikely but possible), which would make the strategy invalid. A lesson for Sida/UD would be the risk of joining this many countries in one strategy, when it is not a regional strategy.